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JULY 4, 1955 **20c**

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Washington Wire .... *T.R.B.*

One thing Adlai Stevenson's candidacy should give is a real opposition to Eisenhower. The Democratic opposition to Ike in Congress today is largely make-believe. A strong, articulate voice, analyzing Ike and his Administration in a Presidential campaign may do America profound good. It is not too much to say that a man might lose the Presidency itself and still by his campaign change the course of history.

To be brutal about it we think Stevenson's chances of winning are not too bright. He is a match for Ike, but perhaps not for prosperity. It looks as though the GOP would have both in '56. One thing is certain, Stevenson can't win by pussyfooting. In an uphill fight the challenger must be bold. Ike is the conservative, and if Stevenson doesn't take the full liberal line he might as well not try.

The indictment of Ike is in three parts: He doesn't work hard enough at being President. He is also letting the Presidential function revert back to the weak role it held for 30 years after the Civil War, and again under Harding-Coolidge-Hoover. And, finally, he looks at life through Big Business eyes.

No Republican can win without Democratic votes, and in vote after vote in the states since 1952 the Democrats have been getting stronger. It is Stevenson's job, if he gets the nomination, to push that liberal movement ahead.

That is not being done by Democrats today in Congress, as we see it, and no clear-cut choice is being created for the voters between the parties. The Democrats are running out on the Dixon-Yates bill, and it looks as though they would do the same thing in the natural gas fight. Like the offshore oil giveaway this natural gas fight is Texas *v.* the Nation, and Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson both come from Texas. It is a fight of city dwellers against the oil-producing states; consumer *v.* producers. The oil companies want federal regulation killed to boost gas prices. There is no question where Democratic interest lies in this battle. Party strength is in the city-dwellers. Yet Speaker Rayburn has ignobly appealed to Eisenhower to help scrap federal regulation. If Adlai Stevenson wants to start the 1956 campaign right away, on a real issue, he can jump into this fight now.

Very shortly you are going to see photographs of the portable nuclear reactors America is going to sell to 22 friendly nations at cut-rates. We are flying one over to the August "atoms-for-peace" conference at Geneva. Reactors will cost up to half a million dollars and will go equipped with some dozen pounds of enriched U-235 to run them, or the equivalent of 600,000 tons of coal. Our officials are going to beat their breasts over these moves, and there will be editorials all over America telling how generous America is.

It is not as simple as that, however. As the *London Economist* drily points out, "a great new export industry is being born." The United States is serving its own enlightened self-interest in getting its samples out first. Russia will push its own as fast as it can. If the US won't team up with Britain, Britain may very well team up with German technocracy. One way or another, there is kudos and cash to be made by the course we are taking and it might be wise to view it realistically.

The Hoover Commission report on water resources and power comes out shortly, too. It would turn the clock back 20 years, while the report of its task force under Ben Moreell, Chairman of Jones & Laughlin Steel, would turn it back half a century. From that viewpoint alone the Hoover report is relatively mild. We doubt, however, if any single expression more clearly shows the real direction of Republican thinking on power policies than this Hoover report. Its frankness may embarrass the GOP, and cause them to try to disown it, but Ike's own prejudices follow the same direction. He is now opening the way to straitjacket TVA through Dixon-Yates, to undercut Hell's Canyon dam, and to end the federal "yardsticks" over the big private utilities. In most legislative fields Ike has followed a sort of watered-down New Dealism, but in the field of power it is different. Here he is backing the reactionaries' counter-revolution.

There is nothing much new to say about Salk polio vaccine. In brief, the government's program is a fiasco. Most US children won't get immunization this polio season. As a post-mortem it is now evident that the big April publicity-announcement stunt was a huge blunder. We don't blame this wholly on Mrs. Hobby. The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis is outside of the government. It needs publicity to live. That is the price you pay for not letting the government handle what is public business. It is "free enterprise" in health. Mrs. Hobby favored this policy; she has even recommended ending federal grants to colleges for research on heart, cancer and other ailments. When manufacture of Salk vaccine started there was no government supervision until the Cutter cases. Again government abdicated its job. Most recently the Administration has asked only a pitiful $28 million to immunize "needy" children, whereas Canada immunizes all children. The current quip here is that Mrs. Hobby has turned the venerable Public Health Service into the Infantile Foundation for National Paralysis.

Notes: Signs of abating national hysteria on the loyalty front continued last week: the Senate drew a noose around McCarthy's throat on a resolution dealing with the Big Four and jerked it tight in a vote of confidence in Ike and lack of confidence in Joe, 77 to 4; Secretary Benson reluctantly admitted maybe soil expert Ladejinsky is not a "security" risk; and a distinguished panel of the US Court of Appeals here unanimously forbade the State Department to withhold passports by "arbitrary" procedure. On the other hand the Defense Department reportedly suspended the security clearances of California Tech's Swiss guided-missile expert, Fritz Zwicky; chiefly, it seemed, because he was Swiss. . . . Harry Truman got a rousing demonstration at the UN 10th anniversary celebration at San Francisco —the man whose implementation of UN pledges in the Korean invasion made this the single most important act in the UN's life to date.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

The American Right to Travel Abroad

THIS YEAR the State Department will issue nearly 475,000 passports to Americans who wish to travel abroad. These citizens and others may feel more secure from now on as the result of a decision handed down on June 23 by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. For the Court has held that travel abroad is a right rather than a privilege to be granted or denied on the exclusive authority of the Secretary of State.

In a unanimous opinion, written by Judge Charles Fahy, the Court relied upon the Fifth Amendment to establish what it called "the right to travel." The "Due Process Clause" of the Fifth Amendment states that no citizen shall be deprived of "life, liberty or property" except by due process of law. The three judges, acting both as oracles of the Constitution's meaning and paladins of its defense, announced that denial of a passport is a deprivation of the "liberty" to move from place to place, and that the State Department would have to give good, substantial reasons for such deprivation in order to satisfy the requirements of "due process." Anyone who is denied a passport may now go to the court and force the Department to explain itself to the judge.

For this substantial gain for civil liberty the nation is indebted to Max Shachtman and his lawyers led by Joseph Rauh Jr. Shachtman is chairman of the Independent Socialist League which was listed as subversive by the Attorney General six years ago. On this ground two years later, he was denied a passport. Shachtman was unable to obtain a passport while the ruling held, nor was he able to gain a hearing to seek a reversal of the ruling. In seeking court relief, Shachtman did not limit his case by complaining that the Secretary of State had refused to disclose the reasons for withholding the passport, or that he had been denied a hearing. He took his appeal to one of the most liberal courts in the country and sought there a ruling on the substance rather than the mechanics of due process. He asked the Court to rule on whether his passport had been denied on legally sufficient grounds. "This position," Judge Fahy declared, "assumes that the discretion residing in the Secretary [of State] is subject in its essence to some judicial scrutiny. We agree."

Judge Fahy's decision, for the Court, spoke of travel as a "natural right," comprehended within the term "liberty," and therefore deserving of constitutional protection as applied by judicial review. His wording is unusual, even for a scholarly Catholic jurist: believers in Natural Law are about as rare these days as Albigensians. There was a time when "Natural Law" was used by the Supreme Court primarily to defend another kind of liberty: "liberty of contract," "the right to purchase or sell labor." Then the "Nine Old Men" used this formula to kill laws fixing minimum wages, maximum hours, prices and working conditions. Now, the word "liberty" seems to be taking another coloration—it is employed to protect individual intangible rights.

In this new sense if Judge Fahy's view prevails *laissez-faire* might become more a *personal* doctrine than an economic one. We may even ask whether the courts might not use the same reasoning to protect other activities, other attributes of liberty, like joining political parties, signing petitions, expounding peculiar doctrines. Certainly this is an "open end decision." Its language is as pregnant as that used by the United States Supreme Court in the District of Columbia Segregation Decision:

> Although this court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue. . . .

Peron and the Church

IN Argentina Juan Peron remains in power. He was never an absolute dictator, as Trujillo is in the Dominican Republic. He remains the number one man. He fractionalized his traditional opponents, partly by conciliation after the death of his extremist and fanatical wife.

Peron moved last November against the remaining source of political opposition, the Church. A series of decrees followed, reducing Church subsidies, legalizing the remarriage of divorcees, and legitimatizing children born out of wedlock, all highly offensive to the Church. But had his full program been carried out, separation of Church and State in Argentina would still have been less than in neighboring Uruguay. While the opposition to Peron extends

"Traveling Papers"

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far beyond the Church, a common front was hard to establish with the radicals whose anti-clericalism was established 30 years ago. The Church, like Peron, is still there as the smoke clears; the two men named to replace the exiled Monsignors Tato and Novoa are likely to arrive soon in Buenos Aires. These events tend to confirm the wisdom of the US Administration in resisting pressures to intervene in protest against religious persecution. If intervention is demanded on this basis it might start in Colombia, where persecution of Protestants has extended beyond anything suffered so far by the Church in Argentina.

Business Incentives

THE HIGH esteem in which the Administration holds businessmen was shown again in hearings before a Senate subcommittee on extending the Defense Production Act of 1950. The purpose of the Act is to reduce the time that it would take to mobilize the nation in case of attack.

To encourage co-operation of business in an emergency, the Administration suggested that the President be allowed to exempt companies from antitrust laws for as long as 20 years after the expiration of the Defense Production Act. Some 30 producers of defense items are already exempted from the laws. They would continue to be exempted under the two-year extension of the act. The proposed 20-year exemption was designed to protect developers of natural resources, in particular oil firms which invest a great deal of money over a long period of time before they get a return.

The Antitrust division of the Justice Department was not happy over the prospect of watching the big oil and mining companies making profitable agreements among themselves for two decades, but refrained from criticizing the proposal, contending that such things must be decided on the basis of what the Defense Department says it needs. The Senate Subcommittee was more critical and asked several questions: (1) Is our present defense condition so perilous that we really need to bore such a large hole in our antitrust laws? (2) Who is to supervise these exempted agreements for two decades? (3) How can anyone foresee if the activities of the concerns involved will continue to further the objectives of the Defense Production Act? (4) What will be the business background of the men appointed by the President to hand out these 20-year exemptions?

As if in answer to the question of who would be giving out the exemptions, the Administration suggested that Congress endorse an expansion of the dollar-a-year-men reserve now being nourished by the Office of Defense Mobilization under an executive order. Businessmen are brought to Washington, given a brief course in the ways of government and asked to return each year for additional training and briefing on current developments.

In theory this is a sensible plan; it does give the Executive Department a working reserve of experienced administrators whose assistance would be essential in an emergency. In some ways, it is a dangerous plan: it permits businessmen, still on the payrolls of private firms and exempted from the conflict of interests statute, to get a foot firmly in the government door. They commute between their home companies and Washington; they hobnob with government officials, make contacts that could come in handy in future sales and bids. Fifteen of 18 division directors in the Business and Defense Service Administration now come from industry.

The Senate Subcommittee voted to extend the antitrust exemptions for military suppliers for two years—but *not* for 20 years. It also put into its bill the Executive Order permitting the use of dollar-a-year men, but restricted them to posts beneath that of division director. Final decisions will thus be left with career employees, who, unlike the businessmen, draw their pay checks from the US Treasury. The Administration can be counted upon to continue to listen attentively to businessmen, but the Democratic-controlled subcommittee has helped prevent the government from falling completely into the arms of the Administration's business advisors.

New Republic A JOURNAL OF OPINION

1826 JEFFERSON PLACE, N. W. WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

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Published weekly and Copyrighted, 1955 in the USA by New Republic, Inc. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 20c; Yearly subscription, $7.00; Foreign, $8.00; Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00.

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"Not a Politician"

"IF WE fail in our trade policy," said President Eisenhower last year, "we may fail in all." Last week he accepted without a struggle the major amendments by which the Senate further weakened an already inadequate trade program.

The Senate amendments open two gaping loopholes in the trade program:

1. An industry can now ask tariff relief if any one of its products is being injured by foreign competition, rather than if the entire industry is injured. Thus a profitable, billion-dollar industry could appeal to the President on behalf of any product, even though the industry is riding the crest of prosperity. Appeals under this clause will be handled for the President by Gabriel

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Hauge, the President's economic adviser.

2. An industry can ask tariff protection if it feels it is essential to national defense and it is being injured by foreign competition. Every industry requesting protection in the past has claimed a direct connection with national defense. Appeals under this clause will be reviewed for the President by Arthur Flemming, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Both clauses are permissive, and call for no mandatory action by the President. But both Mr. Hauge and Mr. Flemming anticipate the need for a full-time staff to handle the rush of appeals. Every past appeal is expected to be revived. And every appeal turned down by the President under one clause will likely be tried again under the other. The question of whether the President has abandoned the principles of Cordell Hull will be answered by how well he can resist the pressures upon him.

There were two critical votes on HR 1 in the House, the first on an amendment by Rep. Clarence Brown (R, Ohio) which was defeated by two votes; the second on an amendment by Rep. Daniel Reed (R, N.Y.) which was defeated by seven votes. In both tests the President received two-thirds of his support from Democrats. In the Senate, in contrast, three leading Democrats, Walter George, Lyndon Johnson and Harry Byrd favored the weakening amendments. They were reportedly opposed by Mr. Hauge. But other Presidential aides, including Gerald Morgan, Fred Seaton, Jack Martin and General Persons, reportedly told the President that so much of his legislative program was in jeopardy that he should accept a watered-down trade bill and save his strength to fight another day. The President's response was to the effect: "I'm not a politician; I'll have to accept your word for it that this is the right thing to do." Right or wrong the President's action came as a shock to Rep. Jere Cooper (D, Tenn.), who as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee had won the battle for the President's trade program in the House. He signed the Conference Report, Representative Cooper told the House, "with great reluctance and deep concern"; the only alternative was to let the trade program die.

Division Among the Allies on the Atom

IT IS ALMOST 10 YEARS since American and British research teams working together succeeded in dividing the atom so as to produce the first nuclear weapon. But the atom is still dividing the allies. Despite the closest co-operation in all other military fields, NATO has not moved an inch beyond co-existence in the field of atomic weapons. Though the whole alliance relies primarily on atomic striking power to deter a major aggression, at the moment that atomic striking power is not only an American monopoly but outside NATO control altogether.

Many people believed that Churchill's decision to produce a British hydrogen bomb was designed primarily to force America to modify her stand against co-operation on atomic weapons. If so, it has failed in its first test. The new Anglo-American Agreements on atomic co-operation specifically exclude co-operation which bears even indirectly on atomic weapons—for example, submarines, ships, aircraft, and certain package power reactors.



The British recognize, of course, that the American Administration's hands are tied by the US Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1954. But they seem to have expected some indication of the Administration's readiness to seek further freedom from Congress in this field. And they undoubtedly thought that the striking progress they have made both in the industrial development of atomic energy and in the techniques of nuclear explosion would make the Americans feel that it would pay them to pool all atomic knowledge.

At first sight the Agreements seem to give the US far more than Britain, since they provide for pooling information in the industrial field where Britain believes herself well ahead, without going further on military atomic co-operation than the US Act already envisages for all America's allies—that is, the exchange of information on the use, and effects, of atomic weapons, without which NATO planning cannot proceed at all. No doubt America would argue that since she already possesses sufficient H-Bombs to destroy all known targets in the Communist bloc, she is not interested in any new techniques which Britain may have developed for producing hydrogen bombs more economically. Meanwhile America seems well ahead in the development of tactical atomic weapons, where Britain has so far contributed nothing. But there is a grave danger for America in holding a virtual monopoly of tactical atomic weapons. It seems more and more likely that as Russia approaches equivalence in thermonuclear striking power America will wish to limit the use of H-bombs to the minimum and to rely rather on the use of tactical atomic weapons in the battle zone. If, when this time arrives, Britain has her own thermonuclear striking force but little tactical strength, she will be most reluctant to abandon a deterrent which is in her own hands for a deterrent which is exclusively American. The US has, in fact, a strong national interest in seeing that her allies develop a tactical atomic armory as soon as possible.

On the industrial uses of atomic energy, however, Britain seems equally at fault. The new agreements offer much less in this field than appears at first sight. And Britain has been noticeably reluctant to co-operate in Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace drive, because she sees golden export opportunities for her own export trade in this field. As a result, Eisenhower has decided to go it alone, by offering nuclear reactors, fuel, and technicians at half-price to other free countries which desire them. From the selfish British viewpoint this looks like a 50 percent export subsidy to America's atomic industries. But to the countries which need atomic power it is another example of American generosity.

Certainly, it is impossible to feel that the present phase of atomic co-existence among the allies can be allowed to last for long. And it is ironic that countries which refuse their allies the co-operation on which their own survival may depend claim to be ready in disarmament talks to offer all this co-operation and more to their enemies.

DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

London

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Alastair Buchan, Washington Correspondent for the *London Observer*, reports from San Francisco

Molotov at the Golden Gate

TO THOSE who hoped—if any did—that the special session of the United Nations to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of its charter, would produce some evidence of reconciliation among the great powers. The San Francisco meeting was on the whole a disappointment. To those who feared—as many did—that it would provide the occasion merely for another propaganda battle, it came as a relief. It was too much to expect the Big Four Foreign Ministers who met in San Francisco only a month before they were due to assemble in Geneva for the biggest intelligence exercise in recent years to confine themselves just to discussing matters of procedure in private and eulogizing the United Nations in public. And yet, the restraint with which Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles defined their differing aims was partly a tribute to the extent to which both men now feel constrained by the pressure of the smaller nations in the United Nations to pull together against the tide of nuclear war. The San Francisco meeting has performed a valuable function as a curtain raiser for Geneva, revealing—but without too much rancor—how far apart Russia and the West are on such questions as German reunification, disarmament, the future of the satellites or of America's military alliances, and thereby stripping away some of the illusions about the possibility of an easy rapprochement which have inevitably been growing in every country.

As the delegates and journalists poured in to San Francisco, no one had any idea what sort of occasion he was attending. The auguries were favorable: the fresh, clean air of San Francisco was an invigorating change from New York or Washington, London or Delhi: veterans of the 1945 conference advised their newer brethren on restaurants and night clubs: Mr. Molotov had admired everything American from Winslow Homer to steel mills on his transcontinental train journey. This buoyant mood was more than sustained by President Eisenhower's speech inaugurating the meeting on Monday. It was a speech that seemed a little starry-eyed even for that audience. It confirmed the impression that the President has been giving in his press conferences for the last six months, namely that because his belated reflections last year on nuclear warfare convinced him that "there is no alternative to peace" a new era of international good feelings therefore is dawning.

The auguries continued to be favorable. Mr. Molotov who on Sunday had proposed to the Secretary General that the meeting should end with a resolution, putting it on record in favor of "peaceful coexistence" (a note clearly designed to coincide with the propaganda of the Helsinki peace conference) was persuaded without too much trouble to drop the idea. The Western Foreign Ministers met Mr. Molotov at dinner in the gloomy grandeur of the Pacific Union Club, and got—or thought they got—his assent to all the proposals for the procedure to be followed at Geneva, save that on the duration of the meeting. On the Tuesday, Mr. Harold MacMillan, the first of the Big Four Foreign Ministers to speak, conformed to the general rule of acting pleasantly. He delivered an uncontentious homily on the value of the United Nations and spoke of "a lifting of the cloud." Even Mr. Abba Eban, the delegate of Israel, never mentioned the Gaza Strip in his speech. At a reception that night along with the bay fog that blew through the rooms of an enormous picture gallery, a sociable Mr. Molotov appeared. His beam could be seen between the expressionless faces of bodyguards whose ill-fitting suits suggested an unfamiliarity with civilian clothes but whose bull necks and broad shoulders would have been a credit to the Notre Dame football team.

But by 11 o'clock on the Wednesday morning the first mood of buoyant optimism had blown out to sea like the fog. Molotov had taken his own allotted 20 minutes and those of two satellites to repeat his familiar views. If there is a "new look" in Soviet policy there was hardly a line in Mr. Molotov's speech that betrayed it. Molotov did not denounce the West in the angry terms he had used in his last major speech, at the time of the substitution of Bulganin for Malenkov, but he gave no evidence of flexibility. His language conformed strictly to the old fashioned *argot* of Stalinist days about the "peace-loving nations" and the "aggressive forces of imperialism." It prompted Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada, who made the only witty speech of the whole week, to demand "a convention for the defense of peace-loving words against verbal aggression." The demand that Molotov put forward for the "dismantling" of American overseas bases was presented in some of the strongest language yet employed by Moscow, and his proposals on Germany and disarmament were an almost verbatim repetition of the Soviet note of May 10. The only points which were in any way new were his suggestions that the United Nations should take cognizance of the Formosa dispute (on which he backtracked at his press conference on Saturday), and for the convening of a World Economic Conference—whatever that may mean.

The first reaction to Molotov's speech among the delegates was one of disappointment among the smaller powers, particularly since his pointed reference to the fact that it was on Russia and the United States that the peace of the world depended, wounded the vanity of Mr. Krishna Menon and the Yugoslavs who see themselves as the mediators in East and West respectively. The second reaction was that he had missed a unique opportunity to appear before the world as a reasonable man, an impression that would help to weaken the Western position at Geneva, however unreasonable he might prove to be in private there.

But the most obvious effect of Mr. Molotov's speech was to deepen the mystery of the man himself. The mere fact of his presence at San Francisco had already been enough to make him the center of attention. While other delegations worked uncomfortably in hotel suites, he and 58 aides, cooks, bedmakers, chauffeurs and bodyguards were dwelling in a large suburban house to which other foreign ministers, Mr. Dulles included, made their pilgrimage. Molotov left this dwelling only to attend the Assembly and UN social functions,

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The Smiling Four: Pinay, Molotov, MacMillan, Dulles



apart from the original dinner to discuss the procedure at Geneva. To those who lunched and dined with him he was affable and relaxed; some of his guests reported him a better listener than he used to be and he did not bully other diplomats as he used to. He talked much in private of Russia's desire for "peaceful co-existence," but he seems to have said little of substance to any of his visitors, and neither he nor his delegation made the play for Asian support which had been expected.

Certainly he said little or nothing to shed light on one of the principal questions which his speech raised. Does Mr. Molotov still correctly interpret Soviet foreign policy? What is his place in the new collective form of government in Moscow? As his handling of himself at San Francisco showed, Molotov is still a clever and powerful diplomat, but in the substance of what he said, may he not have been playing an old record? If Russia is anxious to reach a *détente* in Europe in order to buy time for consolidation of her relations with China, to resolve her agricultural crisis and to lessen the burden of armaments which now bears more hardly on her than on the United States—and that is the conclusion reached by experts in their preparatory talks—can the Molotov speech be taken as even the initial Russian position in the negotiations that will follow on Geneva? There are those who believe that since the central objective of Soviet policy is now the detachment of Germany from the West, that Mr. Molotov, associated as he is with every Soviet action that is most distasteful to Germans from the Ribbentrop pact onward, may shortly, though not before Geneva, have the fact of his advancing age forcibly pointed out to him by Khrushchev and Bulganin. In view of the growing power of Marshal Zhukov in Moscow, as well as his wartime friendship with the President, it seems a possibility that the membership of the Geneva meeting may be widened to include defense ministers, despite the anomaly of taking Mr. Charles Wilson to a conference of this kind.

Once Mr. Molotov had spoken, the UN aspect of the meeting—the attempt to recapture "the spirit of San Francisco"—dwindled. M. Pinay, the French Foreign Minister, tore up his prepared address and took Mr. Molotov up on his assertion—aimed obviously at France—that American overseas bases were unwelcome to the countries where they were situated. Mr. Dulles also began to rewrite his address, causing a detectable current of nervousness. He was asking fellow speakers to lend him some of their time, and it was feared that he might be polishing up one of these polemic catch phrases which have bedeviled American diplomacy in the last two years.

But in fact Mr. Dulles spoke with restraint, concentrating primarily on countering the impression that Mr. Molotov had conveyed that the Soviet Union had taken all the necessary steps for a relaxation of tension, and that the ball now lay at the feet of the United States. Whether it was the effect of Mr. Dulles' speech or of the shooting down of an American aircraft in the Bering Sea on Wednesday, something convinced Molotov that his speech had not adequately presented the Soviet case as the prime mover of peace. When CBS cancelled his weekend television appearance because he would not accommodate himself to free questioning of reporters, he called a surprise press conference on Saturday. Though he produced no fresh news this and his unprecedented politeness about the aircraft suggested that he was not sure of his ground.

San Francisco produced some clues to the atmosphere that will surround Geneva. Clearly the Russians are determined to keep one procedural point—the duration of the conference—unresolved until it starts. Profiting from the burning hope that it will succeed expressed by almost all small nations at San Francisco, and knowing that President Eisenhower feels that he cannot be away from Washington for more than six or seven days in July, the Soviet planners must conclude that the opportunity to throw the blame on him before the world for bringing it to an end is too good to miss.

Another point has emerged: Although the sense of confidence among the Western foreign ministers is in welcome contrast with the preparations for previous meetings with the Russians, the West has got down to detailed planning for Geneva late in the day. Germany is perhaps the least difficult question since the unlikelihood of any agreement with Russia on Germany at this time makes any drastic modification of the original Eden plan unnecessary. But on the question of a European security agreement there has been a ferment of ideas which only now seem to be resolving themselves around the French idea of a system of interlocking guarantees between NATO and its Eastern counterpart. On disarmament the lag is still more serious. The Soviet proposals of May 10, with their apparent reasonableness on every question except the vital one of inspection have lain on the table for six weeks without an answer. But Mr. Harold Stassen's fundamental re-examination of the whole problem has hardly begun. In this field British and French planning is geared to the speed of the Americans and all three may look rather poorly at Geneva in contrast to the robust and "positive" Russians.

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Economic Aid—A Non-Secret Soviet Weapon

THE SOVIET bloc's economic offensive in underdeveloped countries, especially in Asia, has not attracted as much notice as the Austrian peace treaty, or the Soviet courtship of Marshal Tito, but it is part of the same campaign.

In Afghanistan, Russian engineers are paving the streets of Kabul, ancient caravan crossroad of Central Asia which is now the capital for 12 million people. The Russians sold their paving services on a 2.5-percent loan repayable in Afghan goods over a five-year period.

In Iran, Russian pilots are flying hedge-hopping planes which have sprayed 175,000 acres with locust poison (copied from the US aid program).

For India, Russian engineers are designing a steel mill of one-million-ton capacity, and have contracted to deliver the mill with Russian advisers on a $95 million credit, *repayable in Indian rupees over a 12-year period.*

For Indonesia, the Soviet Zone of Germany has extended a $7 million credit for delivery of a German sugar mill worked by 50 German technicians (a very large staff for a sugar mill).

From Burma, five countries of the Soviet bloc have purchased a quarter-million tons of rice which will be paid for chiefly in goods from Communist countries.

This Soviet economic offensive consists of a combination of loans, newspaper advertising, trade exhibits, and exchanges of economic missions, all interwoven with propaganda that Communist countries offer the best approach to rapid economic progress, and that reliance on Soviet trade is the only escape from the boom-and-bust cycle of commodity prices in the Free World.

Communist overtures have not produced loans and technical aid on a scale comparable to the American aid program, but the outlook is sufficiently serious to have prompted two investigative US Government reports. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has released a staff study entitled *Soviet Technical Assistance in Non-Communist Asia.* And the Foreign Operations Administration has prepared for the Congress a report entitled *Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Free World.*

The techniques of the Soviet economic offensive are easily identified. Soviet loans to Asian countries are all tied to trade agreements. Interest rates are substantially lower than those offered by the International Bank or the Export-Import Bank. Repayment is always permitted in local currency or goods.

Recent Russian loans to Afghanistan exceed $10 million and covered, beside the street paving, two gasoline storage installations, two grain elevators, a flour mill and a commercial bakery. A similar loan to Afghanistan from Communist Czechoslovakia is financing a cement factory, a textile mill, and a leather-processing factory. The volume of Afghan goods required to repay these loans will greatly increase Afghan dependence on Communist trade.

The Soviet trade agreement with India has resulted in a number of transactions besides the steel mill. Three Russian mining engineers have surveyed India's industrial diamond mines and Russia has offered to finance heavy equipment for mechanization of the mines. The USSR is short of industrial diamonds. The Russians have contracted to deliver a tool factory, and have shipped light tractors which are being assembled in India by Russians.

India is the testing ground for a number of Russian trade techniques. For example, Russians have been buying a good deal of newspaper advertising space in the newspapers of India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt and several Latin American countries. A full-page advertisement in the *Times of India* on March 22, 1955, announced the opening of showrooms for Soviet bloc equipment and machinery.

The Soviet red carpet for a stream of economic missions from abroad has been directed particularly at India. Missions to Moscow during 1954 and 1955 have included Indian railwaymen, two agricultural groups, steel officials and a mixed industrial mission. Similar groups from Indonesia to Moscow included foreign trade, railway, medical, agricultural, industrial and women's delegations.

Soviet participation in more than 40 trade fairs in 1954 included a spectacular exhibit at the capital of Indonesia, which prompted a *New York Times* correspondent to cable that "the United States was taking a propaganda beating." Other Soviet trade displays were held in Syria, Morocco, Turkey and two Latin American countries.

Recent Communist contributions to the UN Technical Assistance Program afford a secondary approach to many of these same countries. The Soviet Union and Poland have contributed about $3,350,000 to the UN program in the past three years, about one-tenth as much as the United States in the same period. The UN has used Soviet funds to finance a group of Russian statisticians working in India; a group of 10 Indian economists studying economic development in the Soviet Union; and 19 other projects which consist mainly of Russian technical equipment shipped to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Jordan, Yugoslavia, Chile and Ecuador.

The results of the Soviet economic offensive should not be exaggerated. There has been no phenomenal growth of trade between the Communist bloc and the Free World. With 34 percent of the world population the Communist bloc still provides only 2.2 percent of Free World trade. Nor has Soviet blandishment resulted in any breakdown in strategic trade controls, which Western countries have voluntarily invoked against Communist countries.

Moreover, Communist representatives have repeatedly offered goods for barter which they were unable to supply. There is a substantial element of bluff in the trade offensive. A Burmese trading mission seeking $16 million in goods from Communist China last winter was able to find only half that value in goods which Burma needed. At trade fairs Communist representatives have been reluctant to quote prices or guarantee deliveries. Some of the displays seemed to aim more at propaganda about Soviet economic progress than at export of Soviet goods.

Nevertheless, some individual countries such as Afghanistan, Burma and Indonesia could conceivably find themselves seriously dependent upon Communist bloc trade and thus vulnerable to political pressures. Even in a country like India, where only a slight fraction of foreign trade is conducted with Communists, there is immense exposure to Communist propaganda under the various Communist trading techn ques.

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Making a Scapegoat of Lyndon Johnson

by Richard Neuberger

GEORGE NORRIS once said, "Mine has been a lonely pilgrimage." As a new member of the United States Senate, I believe Norris' experience is a lesson we are going to have to keep in mind. Perhaps it has been forgotten in the decade since Norris died. This, in essence, is my personal reaction to the current complaints over the strategy and tactics of the Democratic Party leadership in the Senate.

Of course, Lyndon B. Johnson is not as liberal as George W. Norris. Who in politics is, for that matter? Yet I think Johnson is as liberal as he can be and still continue as the effective leader of the Senators who sit on the Democratic side of the aisle. We hold a 49-to-47 margin over the Republicans, and even this majority of onion-peel proportions depends on "conversions" rather than on victory won at the polls. It exists because (1) my Oregon colleague, Wayne L. Morse, changed his party affiliation from Republican to Democratic, and (2) because Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, triumphant as a write-in candidate over the regular Democratic nominee, has voted with the party which tried to keep him out of the Senate.

Lyndon Johnson could cease to lead a majority the moment any one Democratic Senator decided Johnson's leadership did not please him. A single defection would throw the Senate into a deadlock of 48 to 48, with Vice President Nixon holding the decisive vote. And even a casual canvass of the Democratic roster would indicate a number of prospects for such a bolt were Johnson to seem to be "too" liberal. In fact, Johnson can tally among his "followers" at least three or four Democratic Senators who actively supported Eisenhower for President in 1952. Minority Leader Knowland faces no comparable problem. Republicans are far more orthodox.

There is a nervous tendency to saddle Lyndon Johnson with some of our own shortcomings. I hear Johnson criticized because he favored turning over the tidelands oil reserves to the states, because he now wants to take natural gas pipelines out from under federal regulation. It is claimed that a majority leader, particularly a Democratic majority leader, should rise above such heinous local pressures. I do not agree with Senator Johnson in either of his stands which have lured such criticism, but I wonder how much we liberals of modern vintage have a right to assail Johnson for succumbing to the special interests of his Texas constituents. For example, when it came to removing the oppressive penalty taxes from colored margarine, most contemporary Senate liberals voted with their dairy constituents and against the same consumers whose welfare they champion on the natural-gas bill. I think only Estes Kefauver warned that everyone's civil liberties might be imperiled by the so-called anti-Communist bill which was whooped through the Senate in 1954. To be quite candid about it, I cannot understand why Lyndon Johnson is expected to display Victoria-Cross political qualities when his liberal critics are not themselves bent double with the weight of decorations won for bravery under heavy fire.

Johnson cannot be fairly blamed for some of the lost opportunities which have occurred thus far since Congress convened January 3. These major omissions strike me as four.

1. *Echo Park.* This is the proposed dam which will breach our National Park System with commercial development for the first time in history. In a dubious effort to get some Rocky Mountain Republicans to vote for such bona-fide projects as Hell's Canyon, many Senate liberals actually gave strong support to Echo Park. Yet determined opposition to Echo Park might have stirred throughout the nation the kind of thrilling support which Norris rallied in 1913 when he sought to protect the waterfalls and gorges of the Hetch Hetchy. Americans love the scenic outdoors, and they do not want to see it desecrated. In defense of Senate liberals, it must be said that they were under incomprehensible pressure from the CIO to back Echo Park Dam, despite its adverse impact on long-standing National Park policy.

2. *Salk vaccine.* If anything has stirred the conscience of America, it is the harsh stand taken by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare toward the safety and distribution of the new anti-polio vaccine. The contrast with Canada's orderly and humane program is self-evident. Yet efforts in the Senate to emphasize and underscore this situation have been, at best, disorganized and sporadic. And Senate liberals failed to take advantage of the existing circumstances to present a long-range health program promising to prevent any repetition of the Salk snafu in the future. Our efforts were hit-or-miss rather than co-ordinated.

3. *Prevailing-wages.* After the Davis-Bacon Amendment providing for payment of standard wage rates was included in the Gore Highway bill in committee, an amendment made its appearance on the floor to eliminate this guarantee of fair pay in the spending of approximately $18 billion in public funds. The amendment was sponsored under heavy pressure from Dixiecrats and some New England Republicans, who did not want prevailing wages guaranteed on highway projects. This presented a traditional opening for Senate liberals,

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who had fought for a decent wage rate ever since the days of Norris and the elder LaFollette. All they had to do was point out that the American people did not desire to drive on super-highways built by men getting coolie pay checks. But the vast majority of Senate liberals were not even on the floor when the perfunctory debate occurred which preceded the elimination of the prevailing-wage provision by an unrecorded vote.

4. *The Security program.* If my office is typical, every Senator is buried beneath a cascade of letters from men and women who have been separated from either federal military or civilian service as "security risks." Many of these separations, clouding careers indefinitely, have occurred after the most casual and cavalier investigations. In several instances, it took my office only a comparatively short time to convince certain departments that the person branded as a "security risk" was a perfectly loyal citizen. But the fight now being made by ex-Sen. Harry P. Cain, for all his faults, should be receiving the active and continuing support of some of the articulate and eloquent liberal voices in the United States Senate.

I realize full well the presumptuousness of a freshman Senator in voicing some of these mild and well-intentioned criticisms. Yet I do so only because of my great admiration and respect for the liberals who now decorate the floor of the United States Senate. The eloquence of Wayne Morse, the vast knowledge of Paul H. Douglas, the shining humanitarianism of Herbert Lehman, the parliamentary skill of Hubert Humphrey—these qualities would not be wasted in even a liberal as illustrious as George Norris. But one hates to see such skilled and adventurous climbers failing to rope up when the most challenging glaciers loom directly ahead. I still remember my Scoutmaster of Troop 69 in Oregon, who showed us that five matchsticks tied together made a stronger and stouter staff than 20 matchsticks kept apart.

Although this may bring some skepticism, I would venture the thought that sheer physical exhaustion figures in some of the lost opportunities of the current session. The Senate liberals are a pestered lot. To them, either personally or through the mail, are brought all the injustices of a broad continent. Can't they do something? Won't they speak up? Every liberal is deluged with mail, visitors and demands for speaking engagements. Nor are the sources of the speaking invitations always tolerant when a weary man tries to explain why he cannot finish a tense Senate debate at 5:30 PM, rush to New York by plane for a scintillating speech at an 8 o'clock banquet and then hurry back to Washington by the midnight train to attend a 9:30 committee meeting the next morning. I have seen Senate liberals, their shoes off and ties loosened, lying exhausted on the black leather couches in the Senate Marble Room. Flesh and blood could stand no more. Indeed, I am more drained of strength by the Senate than by climbing mountain peaks with my wife back home.

Still, the coal miner must toil when he is tired, and so must Senators. George Norris had a dogged persistence, and this is one of our needs today. When he was in a desperate struggle, Norris rarely read the newspapers. He told Irving Dilliard of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and me, on the last occasion that I ever saw him, that worry over his press notices merely lessened his capacity for effective service in the cause at hand. Some of this selflessness and determination are required now. Nor can any lack of such qualities be rightfully attributed by us or by our liberal adherents to the Democratic leadership. Lyndon Johnson, for example, wasn't within cablegram distance of the decision by Senate liberals to let the Echo Park issue go by the boards. In fact, Johnson himself might have been on the conservation side if the Democrat liberals had made a fight of it.

Speaking wholly from a lack of experience, my own practice as a Democratic liberal can be explained quite briefly. On issues where I think Democrats may reasonably be united, I go to the majority leader for advice and assistance. This would include such matters as the high dam at Hell's Canyon, the public-power preference clause and lowering the social-security retirement age for women from 65 to 60. On all such questions I have found Lyndon Johnson helpful, sympathetic and in nearly complete agreement with my views. He never has turned me down nor been cavalier with my requests. I doubt if a freshman Senator has a right to ask more.

But with respect to the issues which will be fought in the future, once public opinion has been mobilized, I do not pester the majority leader at all. Here a freshman Senator must do his chores first. They won't be accomplished if he is crouching by the fireside, full of self-pity over his alleged abandonment by Lyndon Johnson.

A BETTER example for liberal Senators to follow is that of Norris who was unshackled by the attitudes of party leaders on forward-looking programs as he was indifferent to pressures from his own state of Nebraska when he believed those pressures were misplaced. Loyal to his own convictions, Norris in 1928 blithely stumped Nebraska which was dry and Protestant and Republican, for Alfred E. Smith who was wet and Catholic and Democratic.

Perhaps we need a few more liberal pilgrims who will strap on crampons, shoulder their kitbags and set out across uncharted snowfields. That's what Norris did. Why gnash our teeth from the overstuffed chairs in the Senate Marble Room? A grinding of molars passes no legislation. Have we gone so soft that we embark only on expeditions which take us no more than a discus throw from the majority leader's chambers? If Norris had waited for an official fiat from either political party before he hit the high trail to reform, the TVA and rural electrification would still be due about the year 2000.

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Liberalism: Illusions and Realities

by Reinhold Niebuhr

THE SPATE of books on conservatism and liberalism in America has resulted in debates about the respective merits of these allegedly opposing political creeds in which a great deal of semantic confusion is manifest. Mr. Clinton Rossiter in his *Conservatism in America* has accurately defined the conservative mood in our nation as a combination of nationalistic preferences and a passion for the economics of *laissez-faire,* which is to say, that our conservatism in domestic politics is the old liberalism of the Manchester School. Mr. Russell Kirk in his *Conservative Mind* seems to assume that there is some authentic conservatism in the mere desire to preserve the status quo of the American paradise; and he rather uncritically seeks to relate this American conservatism with a British conservatism which is rooted in the aristocratic tradition and has none of Kirk's prejudice against the Welfare State, and with the rather pathetic aristocratic tradition of our own Southland, as expounded by Randolph and Calhoun. This Southern tradition was pathetic because it was but a remnant of an old aristocratic society in a nation which had no conscious relations with the European feudal past, and because it was a form of aristocracy based upon chattel slavery and was naturally destroyed with the institution of slavery.

It is obviously necessary to make the most careful distinctions between the conservatism and liberalism which are merely moods or ideologies according to which one defends a status quo or seeks to leave it behind, and the conservatism and liberalism which are cogent political philosophies. We can dismiss the sort of conservatism and liberalism which are dispositions toward some status quo very simply by giving an *a priori* preference for liberalism over conservatism on the grounds that it is not reasonable to defend any status quo uncritically; and that it is certainly not reasonable to do so in the rapidly changing conditions of a technical society in which "new conditions teach new duties and time makes ancient truth uncouth." If being for or against change were the only issue involved, any critical person would be bound to be a "liberal."

If we study the various meanings of "liberalism" and "conservatism" in Western and particularly in American social history, it soon becomes apparent that "liberalism" in the broadest sense is rightly identified with the rise of a modern technical society availing itself of democratic political forms and of capitalistic economic institutions. This "liberal society" came to birth in Britain, France and America in opposition to the feudal aristocratic culture of the European past. "Liberalism" in the broadest sense is therefore synonymous with "democracy." Its strategy is to free the individual from the traditional restraints of a society, to endow the "governed" with the power of the franchise, to establish the principle of the "consent of the governed" as the basis of political society; to challenge all hereditary privileges and traditional restraints upon human initiative, particularly in the economic sphere and to create the mobility and flexibility which are the virtues and achievements of every "liberal society" as distinguished from feudal ones.

But liberalism has more distinct connotations; and upon them hang all the issues of contemporary political controversy. One of these connotations arises out of the history of technical societies; the other arises out of the peculiar philosophy of the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In the first instance, the narrower connotation of liberalism is identified with the peculiar and unique ethos of middle-class life. But since the middle classes soon found the laboring classes to the Left of them, liberalism soon ceased to be the exclusive philosophy of democracy. Even without the rise of labor as a political power, modern democracies, as they developed from commercialism to industrialism, found that the freeing of economic initiative from political restraint was only one side of the problem of justice. The other side was the placing of restraints upon initiative in the interest of security and justice.

Thus in every modern industrial nation the word "liberalism" achieved two contradictory definitions. It was on the one hand the philosophy which insisted that economic life was to be free of any restraint. In this form it was identical with the only conservatism which nations, such as our own, who had no feudal past, could understand. It was the philosophy of the more successful middle classes who possessed enough personal skill, property or power to be able to prefer liberty to security. On the other hand the word was also used to describe the political strategy of those classes which preferred security to absolute liberty and which sought to bring economic enterprise under political control for the sake of establishing minimal standards of security and welfare. It has been rather confusing that both of these strategies go by the name of "liberalism."

The new conservatism about which one hears so much

Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr is a noted Protestant theologian who has written extensively on the nature of man and history.

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these days may claim a right to the title of "liberalism" on the ground that its promise of gaining justice through economic liberty is actually closer to the old classical economic liberalism than the new liberalism is. On the other hand if the concern for justice is the primary hallmark of liberalism, those who want to bring economic enterprise under at least minimal control have as much right to this title as those who want to preserve economic freedom. For a technical society, moving from commercial to industrial activities, was bound to find the emancipation from traditional restraints inadequate in the long run as a program for justice.

Thus it was significant that John Stuart Mill, who gave the liberal creed the most classic expression in the 19th Century, moved in the latter years of his life from pure libertarianism to a liberal socialism. It is even more significant that the Liberal Party in Britain took this turn at the beginning of the century before the Labour Party became a power. In Lloyd George's radical budget the taxing power of the state was used to guarantee minimal security for the workers. This development, in which incidentally Lloyd George was supported by Winston Churchill, Britain anticipated by a quarter of a century the transmutation of Jeffersonian liberalism into Roosevelt's "New Deal." American conservatives have made much of this *volte-face* of the liberal tradition; and in their "liberty leagues" tried to fill the political niche of the seemingly abandoned Jeffersonianism.

In European democracies the desire to establish justice by bringing economic power under political control was advanced by the Socialist parties. In Britain, the old Liberal Party slowly lost ground in the postwar years to labor and the new conservatism. At this moment, the old debate between freedom and control of economic life has narrowed to a very small difference in emphasis between the Tories and the Labour Party, a difference which has become slight in all modern nations. The debate between a responsible Right and a responsible Left is both inconclusive and insoluble because the degree of emphasis which must be put on planning or spontaneity, on control or freedom, cannot be solved in terms of fixed principles. The peculiar conditions of each nation and of each period within a nation must and will determine the degree of emphasis on the one side or the other of the equation.

In all stable modern nations the political situation reflects the insolubility of this problem. Responsible parties, when not corrupted by demagogy and dishonesty, know that the economic and political life of a community cannot go too far in a collectivist direction without becoming prey to bureaucratic stagnation. Nor can it go too far in the direction of an uncontrolled economy without aggravating the perils of insecurity and the evils of inequality arising from centralization of power. Both evils are inherent in the economic process itself, particularly in our era of rapid growth of techniques.

The semantic difficulties arising from this shift in meaning of the word liberal as a technical civilization moves farther and farther from its original contest with an organic and aristocratic society, are, however, simple compared with the confusions of definition which arise from the fact that "liberalism" is both a political philosophy, identified with the rising technical civilization, and a total philosophy of life which was elaborated in the French Enlightenment. This confusion becomes the greater because liberalism and a modern technical society had their simultaneous inception in three modern nations, Great Britain, France and America. In one of these, France, the aristocratic past, based upon an organic society, was always in the background with its reactionary illusions which in turn incited the illusions of the Enlightenment. In another, Great Britain, the old society was broken in the Cromwellian revolution. Britain finally settled down at the end of the century with a constitutional monarchy of William and Mary which fused both liberal democracy and a more creative version of the old society. This fusion has ever since characterized British life and made John Locke on the one hand, and Edmund Burke on the other, the exponents of the chief strains of British political philosophy. In America the liberal society and the new nation had a simultaneous birth on a virgin continent with only a few vestigial remnants of the old society, and these were finally eliminated in our Civil War. For these and other reasons, American liberalism drew its primary inspiration from the ideological presuppositions of the culture which gave rise to the French Revolution and excluded a part of the British inheritance.

The French Enlightenment was "liberal" in its social policy in the sense that it championed all the extensions of political power and freedom from political control of economic enterprise which characterized the whole middle-class movement in its struggle with the feudal past. But it also had a total philosophy of life based on confidence in the perfectibility of man and on the idea of historical progress. These two ideas were basic to all the political miscalculations of the Enlightenment and were the source of its errors. "Liberalism" acquired a special connotation as a philosophy of life which did not take the factors of interest and power seriously, which expected all parochial loyalties to be dissolved in more universal loyalties; and which was indifferent to organically or historically established loyalties and rights under the illusion that it would be simple for rational man to devise more ideal communities and rights. The liberalism of the French Enlightenment was thus based upon illusions as to the nature of man and of history. It was quasi-anarchistic and pacifist in its attitude toward the coercions which are a necessary part of communal cohesion and toward the conflicts of interest which always take place between communities. These

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were the illusions which Burke challenged in *Reflections on the Revolution in France.*

The philosophy of the Enlightenment was not shared by such conservatives as John Adams or such Jeffersonians as James Madison. Our Constitution was, in fact, informed by a realism which contradicted all the illusions of the Enlightenment. Nevertheless it became the primary source of inspiration for the democratic movement in America. When sectarian Christian perfectionism merged with the thought of the Enlightenment on our frontier, perfectionist illusions in regard to man became the staples of the American liberal movement.

It must be apparent to anyone that it adds to the semantic confusion if those who do not share the illusions of Diderot and Condorcet are termed "conservatives." Such persons would be more accurately defined as "realistics," particularly since a realistic estimate of perennial factors in the historical and social situation may be put into the service of either a conservative or advancing social policy. It would certainly be wrong to define a labor leader as "conservative" merely because he knew, as every good labor leader must know, that a collective bargaining agreement is not merely a rational or moral encounter, and that its success depends upon the strength and unity of the force at his disposal. Incidentally, it must be observed that organized labor has always been "realistic" in this sense. Its realism included preference for proximate goals of justice, while the more academic liberalism was frequently beguiled by the utopian illusions of the Enlightenment.

In terms of international policy, confusion would be avoided if the word "conservative" were confined to the pure nationalist. It certainly does not fit the internationalist who knows about the perils and responsibilities of a nation in the potential global community, but who is not persuaded that "world government" is the answer.

There is, in short, no reason why the errors of the Enlightenment should continue to bedevil the "progressive" political movements, and why "liberalism" should be identified with illusions about human nature and history. Sometimes the foes of liberalism insist that the illusions are inherent in the policy. There are even some belated liberals who darkly insinuate that a realist who professes to be liberal in social policy must be a crypto-conservative who has yet to reveal his true colors. These confusions could be eliminated if the clear evidences of history were presented to prove that the "liberal" illusions are not necessary for democracy, and might actually have a baneful influence upon its life. The best evidence for this thesis is a comparison between the course of British and French democracy. In France the enthusiasm for a liberal society soon degenerated into Jacobin fanaticism and Bonapartist absolutism.

In contrast, the curious blend of aristocracy and democracy in Britain slowly evolved into the world's most stable democracy, in which "liberty broadened down from precedent to precedent." The only remnant of the old feudalism is the still prevalent class snobbishness of British life. This superior achievement was due, partly to the superior wisdom of the Lockean type of liberalism and partly to the interplay between the Lockean liberalism and the Burkean type of conservatism. The aristocratic tradition at its worst tried to maintain the traditional privileges of the feudal order. At its best it appreciated the organic aspects of community better than urban-centered liberalism. One must include under the "organic" aspect of community the force of mutually and historically acknowledged rights and responsibilities, in comparison with the "inalienable" rights which are worthless if no community acknowledges them. One must also include standards of justice which have developed by slow and unconscious growth rather than by conscious political intervention. Finally, to the organic aspects one must reckon the hierarchies of authority which develop in every political and economic realm, and without which the community could not be organized.

It is rather ironic that the rigorous equalitarian creed of Communism should in practice generate the monstrous inequalities of power and privilege which we see in the Russian scene. The inequalities are more excessive than usual because there is nothing in the creed that would come to terms with functional hierarchies as such. We have lesser ironic realities in so-called liberal communities, whether in labor unions or in churches. In every case justified inequalities of authority develop, and usually some unjustified inequalities of privilege.

An academic liberalism with its abstract notions of liberty and equality has never been able to come to terms with these realities of the community. There is, therefore, some truth in the aristocratic-conservative tradition which the most democratic society must rescue from the error of aristocratic pretentions and must incorporate into the wisdom by which the life of the community is regulated and integrated. This truth may be imbedded in a conservative tradition. But it must be freed from the errors which are also transmitted in the conservative tradition. If that is done the result can only be a realistic liberalism. It will be a liberalism because only that philosophy, stripped of its utopian errors, leaves the way to the future open.

There is, unfortunately, no social locus in America for a valid "conservative" philosophy. The more parochial part of the business community is bound to develop a conservatism in which a decadent *laissez-faire* liberalism in domestic politics is compounded with nationalism. It can be beguiled from these prejudices only by the prestige of an Eisenhower. The realism embodied in a valid conservatism, therefore, becomes the property of all parties and tendencies which have enough pragmatic wisdom to discern the perennial factors in the shifting historical scene.

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From Big to Bigger

by Walter Adams

IN 1950 Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver Act prohibiting mergers whose effect may be "substantially to lessen competition . . . or tend to create a monopoly." Since then some 2,100 mergers have been consummated —in apparent disregard of the new law. The Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission who might be expected to enforce the law assures us instead that mergers are not necessarily injurious to the public interest. The Brownell Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws has maintained silence on the need for intensified anti-merger action.

In 1954, according to the FTC, there were three times as many mergers as in 1949—almost as many as during the postwar peak of 1946. Nearly two-thirds of the acquisitions reported in the last six years were made by large companies (those with assets of $10 million or more). By contrast, only eight percent of the acquisitions were made by small companies (those with assets of $1 million or less). Notable among the larger mergers is the consolidation of Olin ($232 million assets) and Mathieson ($339 million assets) which followed by only two years Mathieson's purchase of E. R. Squibb, the giant pharmaceutical house. Equally important are the changes wrought by mergers in the textile industry: the $428 million marriage between Burlington Mills, Pacific Mills, and Goodall-Sanford; the $200 million consolidation of American Woolen, Textron and Robbins Mills; and the smaller, but nonetheless important, mergers between Lowenstein and Wamsutta, Botany Mills and Princeton Worsted, United Merchants and A. D. Juilliard, J. P. Stevens and John P. Maguire. All these foreshadow a transformation of a once highly competitive industry.

Why do these corporations combine into larger units? According to the FTC, businessmen hope to achieve the following advantages by merger: additional capacity, product diversification, backward integration (acquiring a raw material supplier), forward integration (acquiring distribution outlets), and additional capacity located in new markets. Other factors are surplus cash available to acquiring companies, lack of financial resources needed for expansion and modernization, and tax savings available to companies which buy out distressed concerns.

But these motives have no standing in the law. Its only criterion is the *effect* on competition. And if a particular merger is likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition it is clearly illegal.

Walter Adams, Professor of Economics at Michigan State College, is a member of Attorney General Brownell's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws and the author of Monopoly in America: The Government as Promoter, *to be published this fall.*

The rationale of the law is simple. It permits the expansion and growth, the forward and backward integration, the product and market diversification of any given corporation. At the same time, it recognizes that a growing enterprise has the alternative of building or buying. If the corporation builds, it creates additional capacity and may increase competition. If it buys, it only destroys a competitor. And the destruction of competition is not in the best interests of free enterprise.

For these reasons the Celler-Kefauver Act sets up a presumption against mergers. Accordingly the Justice Department withheld its blessings from the proposed union of the Bethlehem and Youngstown Steel Companies. Bethlehem's president had argued that the merger would increase competition (by enabling Bethlehem to invade the Midwestern market) and that the combined company would still be smaller than the giant US Steel Corporation. But Antitrust Chief Stanley Barnes was not impressed with this reasoning. If, he said, the Bethlehem-Youngstown marriage were permitted, "where would we stop mergers in the steel industry?" If we permit small companies to merge so as to compete more effectively with the large ones, if we allow the large companies to merge so as to compete more effectively with the giants, the end result will be the dominance over our economy by the Big Three's, the Big Four's, the Big Five's.

Bethlehem apart, the enforcement record is far from encouraging. Out of 2,135 mergers, the Justice Department has prosecuted only those attempted by Schenley, General Shoe and the Hilton-Statler Hotels. Three more, pressed by Pillsbury, Luria Bros. and Crown-Zellerbach were opposed by the FTC. Congress, for its part, has made little use of its investigative role. The only anti-merger legislation introduced is the Sparkman-Celler bill to bring banks under the Clayton Act.

IN support of this bill, Representative Celler points to the Chase National-Bank of Manhattan merger and the disappearance of more than 600 commercial banks since World War II. He observes that the 10 largest banks now hold 46 percent of the nation's bank deposits and that such concentration restricts the borrower's alternative choice. "No matter how many branches exist," says Mr. Celler, "the borrower faces the same borrowing conditions set by the home office." The Sparkman-Celler bill would also require corporations to notify the antitrust agencies before consummating any merger. Even if this bill should be enacted, the crucial problem would still be in enforcement. As long as the FTC is dominated by men like Mr. Howrey, as long as the government itself promotes monopoly through privilege-creating legislation as in atomic energy and synthetic rubber and undermines regulation as in the trucking and airlines services, the outlook for competition is dim.

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The Superficial Aspect

Polio and Principles

All Danish children in the first age group have now received anti-polio shots "without incident," according to the official report. If the stuff is any good, this means that some Danish children who would have been doomed will not die of polio this year; but Denmark is afflicted with more or less socialized medicine, which some Americans seem to regard as a worse calamity than the deaths of a few children.

All Canadian children in the first age group have also received the vaccine, the government footing the bill without even requiring a pauper's oath of the parents. But that is "creeping socialism" and the fact that theoretically some Canadian children will survive, instead of dying or being crippled by polio, seems to be lightly regarded by our humanitarians.

Only a small proportion of American children in the same age group have been given the vaccine, but the American medical profession is free of the threat of socialism, creeping or galloping, so let us thank God that we are not as other men. Theoretically, American children will die for lack of the protection,

> But things like that, you know, must be
> At every famous victory.

The mortality is regrettable, of course, but at least it will stimulate business in the coffin trade, and coffin-making is free private enterprise. Then among those who don't die some presumably will be permanently crippled and will have the privilege of paying for unsocialized medical services during the remainder of their lives. But the important thing is that the United States Government has escaped taking control of this vast problem, and you can see the marvelous results.

If the results at which you marvel are the prevailing confusion, suspicion, dissension and rapidly mounting distrust of medical science, that is because you are perversely fixing your eyes on the wrong things. You should take note of the facts, first, that the Administration has avoided being saddled with any additional responsibility for the health of the nation's children and, second, that no member of the American Medical Association will be subjected to the humiliation of receiving his pay-check from the federal government instead of from an individual patient.

True, some members of the AMA seem to be a little doubtful of the value of the latter triumph. As regards the government's checks, two things must be admitted—they come in promptly and they don't bounce, which is more than can be said of all those drawn on private accounts. But the bulk of the doctors seem disposed to yield that personal advantage in order to secure to their patients the immense moral benefit that comes from paying $15 for the vaccine themselves instead of being pauperized by having the government pay it. This solicitude of the medical men for our moral as well as physical health is really more than the laity ever expected.

This is, however, subsidiary. The memorable achievement of the Salk vaccine affair is its demonstration of the granitic firmness of the Administration in resisting the advance of creeping socialism. If the government had moved swiftly and resolutely to take control of the distribution of this new remedy, at least until the supply catches up with the demand, it would have set a precedent horrible to rugged individualists.

It is no answer to say that this was an unprecedented situation requiring unprecedented action. It may be that no comparable discovery will be made for the next hundred years, but you can't put any reliance in research scientists; one may pop up tomorrow with a preventive of cancer, or tuberculosis or heart disease. If that should occur, and if the precedent had been established in the Salk case, then the public would expect prompt, intelligent and effective action on the part of the government again; and if you teach the public to expect the government to act promptly, intelligently and effectively, where will the American Way of Life be? The prudent thing was to establish no precedent.

This the Salk vaccine affair has accomplished to a marvel. The Secretary of Health *et cetera* is now on record as disavowing any direct responsibility except through the Surgeon General, and the Surgeon General has no responsibility except through the law, and the law as he knows it is the interpretation given it by the Secretary of Health *et cetera,* and if in that runaround you can fix responsibility you are sharper than I am.

In short, the Secretary of Health *et cetera* and the Surgeon General propose to hold the offices but not to hold themselves responsible for prompt and intelligent action when any new condition arises affecting health. Theirs is the charmingly simple policy attributed to Giovanni de Medici: "Since God has given us the Papacy, let us enjoy it." President Eisenhower, indeed, in his San Francisco speech revealed a vague impression that something ought to be done by somebody sometime about something, but no such uneasiness troubles his camp-followers in Washington. They are for enjoyment, and they hold to the purpose with zeal and immense tenacity.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Right To Write Badly

by Irving Howe

THE publication of Isaac Babel's collected stories, coming at a time when the dominant political and cultural trends are deeply hostile to his kind of imagination, is cause for happiness. Most of the stories have appeared in one or another English version, but now to have them in their proper order and thereby to receive their accumulative impact is to know that Babel is not merely, as Maxim Gorky claimed, the most gifted prose writer of post-revolutionary Russia, but one of the literary masters of our century.

This, in a way, is hardly news. Babel's work, when it first came out in the twen-

The Collected Stories of Isaac Babel, translated by Walter Morison, with an introduction by Lionel Trilling (Criterion; $5).

ties, was quickly praised by the Russian and European critics: anyone with half an ear could recognize that he was, to put it bluntly, a genius. But we live in a culture so committed to opportunism that Babel's work, incompatible with the religiosity and obscurantism that have recently dominated the literary world, needs to be read as if it *were* new, a suddenly discovered gift from an earlier generation.

A few words about Babel's life may help illuminate the quality of his writing. Born in 1894, he was raised in a lower-middle-class Jewish family in Odessa, and during the pre-revolutionary period, when he lived and starved in Moscow as a literary bohemian, he became a protegé of Gorky. After five years of fighting in the revolution and civil war, Babel returned to his writing and won immediate fame as the author of *Red Cavalry*, a book of breath-taking stories that draw from his experiences with a Cossack unit in Budenny's army. But as the Stalin dictatorship hardened its grip, Babel wrote less and less (he was not, in any case, very productive) and after a time he lapsed into silence.

In 1934 Babel made one of his rare public appearances, at the first Russian Writers' Congress, partly to join in the ritual of pledging loyalty to the regime, partly to explain his failure to publish. His performance—it is vividly described in Mr. Trilling's introduction—was a remarkable political act. He practiced, said Babel, a new literary genre: he was "the master of the genre of silence." And in the midst of his praise for the regime and the party, he remarked, as if in passing, that they presumed to deprive writers of only one right, the right to write badly. "Comrades," he went on, "let us not fool ourselves: this is a very important right and to take it away from us is no small thing. . . . Let us give up this right, and may God help us. And if there is no God, let us help ourselves. . . ."

The right to write badly!—which is to say, to write from one's own feelings, even from one's own mistakes. It would be hard to imagine a more courageous, and a more saddening, gesture on the part of a writer whose every impulse was for the spontaneity, the freedom, the playfulness which his society denied. Babel, who was protected by Gorky and for whom, it is rumored, even Number One had a soft spot, suffered no immediate punishment, other than the continued silence he had imposed on himself. But in 1937 he was arrested and two or three years later he died in a concentration camp. Except for a memorial note on Gorky which appeared in 1938, Babel remained silent to the end, the master of his genre.

The stories in *Red Cavalry*, which form over half the present volume, impress one in endless ways, but their primary impact is shock. Hard, terse, violent, gorgeously colored, they come upon one like disciplined explosions. Primitive Cossack ways jar against Babel's sophisticated consciousness; the random brutality that is the inheritance of centuries of blackness suddenly lifts itself to a selfless red heroism, and in the very moment of doing so helplessly corrupts the heroism; extremes of behavior, weaving into one another as if to spite all moralists, bewilder Babel as narrator and the reader as onlooker.

The stories turn upon Babel's struggle with a problem that cannot be understood unless it is seen both in the immediate historical context (the Russian Revolution) and in the context of Babel's personal being and tradition as both intellectual and Jew. Though he was not, so far as we know, concerned with politics as ideological definition or power strategy, Babel understood with absolute sureness the problem that has obsessed all modern novelists who deal with politics: the problem of action in both its heroic necessity and its ugly self-contamination, the "tragic flaw" that is at the heart of an historical action which by virtue of being historical must to some extent be conceived in violence and therefore as a distortion and coarsening of its "self." But it must be stressed that Babel sees this problem not as a mere exercise in metaphysics: for him it is part of the very texture of action. And it is in this sense, despite the virtual absence of explicit politics, that the stories in *Red Cavalry* are profoundly revolutionary: under the red heat of Babel's passion, creation and contemplation melt into one.

The problem of historical action also absorbs Malraux and Silone in their best novels, and in Bert Brecht's great poem "To Posterity" it receives its most exalted and its most shameful expression, for here every word is bitterly true yet the poem itself is put to service as a rationale for Stalinism. For Babel, characteristically, the problem turns into one of personal assertion, his capacity to embrace and engage in, yet at some level of awareness to stand apart from, the most terrifying extremes of human conduct.

IN his introduction, Mr. Trilling has raised, or perhaps I should say, abstracted, this problem into a kind of timeless moral dialectic. "In Babel's heart," he writes, "there was a kind of fighting—he was captivated by the vision of two ways of being, the way of violence and the way of peace, and he was torn between them." True as this is, I think it misses the center of Babel's concern, which was not so much the choice between "two ways of being" open to men in almost any circumstances and at almost any time, but rather the unbearable—unbearable because felt as entirely

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necessary—difficulties of being an artist committed to the fate of a desperate revolution. One very important side of Babel was a Bolshevik, or tried hard to be ("O regulations of the Russian Communist Party," begins one story, "You have laid headlong rails through the sour pastry of our Russian tales"), and precisely from this side of Babel came some of the energies and anxieties that give life to his work. Like it or not, we cannot blink this simple fact, nor the equally important fact that Babel, as a writer whose politics and esthetics meet in an appetite for extremes, does not lend himself very easily to those more reasonable modes of feeling which Mr. Trilling has designated as the Liberal Imagination. To deprive a writer of the immediacy, even the distracting immediacy, of his preoccupations is at times to lessen his capacity for disturbing and uprooting us.

Some of the most terrible stories in *Red Cavalry* are directed against Babel himself, against his inability to kill other men and his tragi-comic efforts to adapt himself to the ways of the Cossacks. The Jewish literary man, with spectacles on his nose and autumn in his heart, needs to prove to himself that, *given the historical necessity*, he can commit acts which for the Cossack are virtually second nature. But since he is also a human being and a writer of imaginative largesse, Babel in the course of "lending" himself to the Cossacks falls in love with their gracefulness of gesture and movement. (Mr. Trilling, linking Babel to Tolstoy, has some acute remarks on this.) Above all, Babel admires the Cossacks' sureness of manner, their unreflective absorption in inherited modes of life.

Yet he does not sentimentalize the Cossacks nor use them, as a modern literary man might, to sanction his own repressed aggressiveness. He remains in awed puzzlement before the ancient mysteries of their ways, and even when he achieves occasional rapport with them he does not pretend to understand them. But he grants them every possible human claim, and he trembles beneath the lash of their simple unqualified criticism.

In a magnificent five-page story called "The Death of Dolgushov," a wounded Cossack, his entrails hanging over his knees, begs Babel to shoot him, but Babel, soft and scrupulous, funks it. A comrade of the wounded man does the job and then turns furiously upon Babel: "You guys in specs have about as much pity for chaps like us as a cat has for a mouse." In another five-page masterpiece, "After the Battle," a Cossack curses Babel for having ridden into battle with an unloaded revolver ("You didn't put no cartridge in. . . . You worship God, you traitor!") and Babel goes off "imploring fate to grant me the simplest of proficiencies—the ability to kill my fellow-men." And at the end of *Red Cavalry* another Cossack pronounces his primitive sentence upon Babel: "You're trying to live without enemies. That's all you think about, not having enemies."

As counterforce to the Cossacks Babel turns to the Polish Jews, squatting in their villages while opposing armies trample back and forth, passive and impervious to the clamor for blood. Even as he fights in the Red Army, Babel listens, with the attentiveness of a child, to Gedali, the Hassid who believes that "the Revolution means joy" and who wants "an International of good people." "I would like every soul to be listed," says Gedali, "and given first-category rations. There, soul, please eat and enjoy life's pleasures. Pan comrade, you don't know what the International is eaten with. . . ." "It is eaten with gunpowder," answers Babel, "and spiced with best-quality blood."

The Jews of Poland, with their "long bony backs, their tragic yellow beards," pierce through the taut objectivity of Babel's narrative and stir in him a riot of memories ("O the rotted Talmuds of my childhood!"). He goes back and forth from the Cossacks, strange, cruel and beautiful, to the ghetto Jews, who "moved jerkily, in an uncontrolled and uncouth way, but [whose] capacity for suffering was full of a sombre greatness . . ." If *Red Cavalry* is a paean, ambiguous but ardent, to the force of revolution, it is also an elegy for the dying ghetto, for "the Sabbath peace [which] rested upon the crazy roofs of Zhitomer."

Even to mention Babel's style is to involve one's self in a tangle of contradictions and frustrations. Gestures of bare violence turn abruptly, without notice or preparation, into states of reflective quietness and repose. Objectivity seems the dominant mode, yet few modern prose writers would dare indulge in such lyrical apostrophes and such laments as fill Babel's pages. We have been taught to value terseness and understatement; but in Babel terseness has nothing whatever to do with understatement, since it is actually the consequence of the boldest political and metaphysical generalizations. Indeed, hardly another writer of our time has succeeded so well in making the generalization, even the political slogan, so organically a part of his imagery. One moves in these stories with a dizzying speed from conceptual abstraction to primitive notation: Babel never permits the reader to rest in any mold of style or upon any level of perception, he always drives one from surprise to surprise. In some of the stories there is a surrender to sadness as complete as the urge to motion and violence that accompanies it. In other stories the event itself has been removed from sight, and the surface of the prose is devoted to a few wry ripples of talk and a few startling images of place and weather.

The best observation on Babel's style has been made by John Berryman, who has noted certain similarities to the style of Stephen Crane. In both writers there is an obsessive concern with compression and explosion, a kinesthetic ferocity of control, a readiness to wrench language in order to gain nervous immediacy. Both use language as if to inflict a wound. But the differences are also important. Babel, as Berryman goes on to mention, is warm, while Crane is cold. And more important, I think, Babel has a wider range of effects; by comparison, Crane seems a little stiff-jointed.

The two main literary sources upon which Babel seems to have drawn, Russian and Yiddish, flourished most in the 50 or 75 years directly before he began to write; he was one of those writers who spring up at the end of such a creative period and absorb its energies as if they were still at their fullest. The Chekhov strain in Russian literature is strongly evident in Babel's miscellaneous stories (though not so much in *Red Cavalry* or his other group called *Tales of Odessa*); one quickly recognizes the pathos, the warm skepticism of the older writer. The Yiddish literary influence is less likely to be noticed by American critics (Mr. Trilling pays no attention to it). But surely no one who has read Sholom Aleichem can fail to see that in Babel's Odessa stories there is a remarkable parallel of effect: the comic grasp of

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social relationships, the sardonic arguing with God, the attraction to the undersides of history. Compare Babel's bitter wit with Sholom Aleichem's impudent reverence in writing about Jewish fate.

> [Babel]: "But wasn't it a mistake on God's part to settle the Jews in Russia, where they've had to suffer the tortures of Hell? Would it be bad if the Jews lived in Switzerland, where they'd be surrounded by first-class lakes, mountain air and nothing but Frenchmen? Everybody makes mistakes, even God."
>
> [Sholom Aleichem]: "Apparently if He wants it that way, that's the way it ought to be. Can't you see? If it should have been different it would have been. And yet, what would have been wrong to have it different?"

Sometimes the richness of emotion, and often the very phrasing of his idiom, is understandable only in terms of Babel's relationship to Yiddish literature. In a story called "In the Basement" the vulgar-loving rebuke of a grandfather to a boy who tries to commit suicide ("My grandson . . . I'm taking a dose of castor oil, so as to have something to place on your grave") is given its true value and inflection only if one knows that in the Jewish mores suicide is taken to be not merely impious, but in a strictly human sense, shameful.

I shall have to stop in a moment, but before I do a word needs to be said about the underlying quality of Babel's work which gives it a special excitement for our time. Lost as he often is in melancholia and sadness, perplexed and perhaps even a little betrayed as he sometimes is by violence, Babel — through his simple readiness to accept his own desires—makes upon life the most radical of demands: the demand for happiness. In his work one finds a straining toward a union of passion and tenderness, those two elements of feeling which Freud says have become dissociated in the life of modern man and which, because they are dissociated, tend to decline into aggressiveness and impotence. I do not say that Babel often achieves this union, only that he will not let anything, not even "the regulations of the Communist Party," distract him from straining toward it. In his work everything becomes eroticized, everything becomes animated: love and energy come closer.

There is a lovely little story by Babel in which he describes how a baby named Karl-Yankel (half Marxist-half Jew) is being fought over by the two sets of believers. Babel, watching the comic struggle, ends the story by telling himself, "It's not possible . . . it's not possible that you won't be happy, Karl-Yankel. It's not possible that you won't be happier than I."

Fun and Allure in Literature

by Mark Schorer

LOUIS KRONENBERGER is that rare kind of writer, a literate literary journalist, and his criticism is of a sort much more familiar to the British than to the American tradition. It is, indeed, less criticism (if by criticism one means "comparison and analysis") than it is appreciation, and in these essays Mr. Kronenberger himself continually recognizes the distinction. "Since Mencken," he writes, for example:

> Since Mencken, indeed, there has come about a sort of division or bifurcation of Mencken's labors, the neatly fenced critical highroad climbing toward the chill uplands of the Eliots, the journalistic lowroad dropping to the swampland of the Peglers.

Mr. Kronenberger wishes to be, and quite safely remains, on the sunny plain. He turns his back on the swampland, but over and over he throws his glance uneasily at the chill uplands. They trouble him with the thought that they are perhaps not quite so chilly as he supposes.

In his essay on Pope, he writes:

> Ours is an age with, critically, a greater capacity to anaylze than to appreciate. . . . It is just not a very splendid age for telling us what a work of art *is*; what it, so to speak, tastes like . . . the only very important thing is the poetry itself. Compared with what there is to appreciate in him, there is little to analyze. Technically, yes . . . but his "meaning" demands almost none . . . only the language is Pope's, only the language really mattered to him, and only the language, for the most part, need matter for us. . . . I have left to the very end mention of certain qualities of Pope which one would sometimes gather are beneath notice in literature, but which I am bound to think are above praise—his great energy, gaiety, verve. They are the qualities that keep Pope—and most literature — fresh; that make Pope — and much literature—fun.

And in his esssay on Byron's *Don Juan*:

> . . . I do not think it superficial to suggest that what the poem *is* enormously outdistances anything it may mean. The critical malady of our age is an indifference to sheer creativeness as a thing—of power and of pleasure —in itself. In its itch to correlate and laminate and explain, current criticism has half lost the instinct to respond and enjoy. Worse, in its obsession over what makes the clock tick, it all too often fails to notice whether it tells the right time.

And finally, in the late piece called "Pundits and Philistines":

> Of course there is serious criticism—a lot of serious criticism—being written in America by very able critics. But in general, by its dead, priggish manner, its neglect of the pleasurable in art, serious criticism has failed of leverage and is failing of influence. More and more of our serious critics are moving into the tight, gnomelike little world of the pedagogues, carrying on endless ill-natured controversies in print, confusing purism with integrity, using every critical article as the basis for another. As a result, criticism very misguidedly denies literature any sense of allure. . . .

These quotations are worth setting down only to show that Mr. Kronenberger is concerned to point out that he knows on what ground he walks. For surely it need not be said at this date that to propose appreciation without analysis is to limit the scope no less than the intensity of appreciation; that the proposition that "the only important thing is the poetry itself" is the very basis of the criticism that here seems under attack; that technical analysis, analysis of "the language," is again precisely the analysis that the critics

The Republic of Letters, by Louis Kronenberger (Alfred A. Knopf, $3.75).

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whom Mr. Kronenberger seems to have in mind would be concerned with (and are language and meaning separate? can language mean something different, either more or less, from that which it means?); that "indifference" to "sheer" creativeness is probably a concern with the concrete particularities of creativeness; that criticism today has by no means failed of "influence" except in areas where it has never had and never will have influence, at the same time that it has almost alarmingly made its weight felt in the quarters to which it is available; and that the alternative to the "gnomelike world of the pedagogues" is perhaps only the air-conditioned nightmare of Time, Inc. But if Mr. Kronenberger knows where he walks, one may still wonder if those are not strawmen who inhabit the chill uplands toward which he nervously but continually peers.

MORE positively, one is happy to say that his collection of fugitive essays, reviews, and introductions makes a lively book which, if it seldom instructs, very rarely fails to please. Divided almost symmetrically into two parts, the first pertaining chiefly to the 18th Century, the second to the 20th, the book gives us an author who is not only literate but also socially adept, with a gift for the witty phrase and the neatly balanced, Johnsonian clause and, occasionally, period. ". . . If there is any chance of our becoming better than we are, it is through perceiving that we are worse than we think." ". . . Whoever stepped on his toes could not sidestep his anger." "She had very few friends, but time was one of them." ". . . The age which made a god of decorum all too frequently made a beast of itself. . . ." ". . . Doubtless tact made it ignore what taste would have made it condemn. . . ." Who would be so churlish as to deplore a collection that is characterized by such felicities as these? And these, one should say, far outnumber the lapses, when the lightly tripping foot slips into the bog and the appeal is to "the eternal boy in us," the inquiry after the "GBessence." Nor would anyone complain on the score of those qualities of literature that Mr. Kronenberger most enjoys: "energy," riotousness and the "recklessly creative," "high spirits, lively turns, audacity," "allure" and "fun." But the very pursuit of these values brings home to us the limitations of the appreciative essay.

A writer like Mr. Kronenberger finds himself, first of all, in the position of trying to persuade us, *through the qualities of his own prose,* that these qualities exist in the writer he is discussing. In short, he can only remind us or make us believe that they are there, he cannot in the least tell us what they exactly are or how they operate in a creation. The appreciative essay becomes, then, a kind of substitute for the work that it means to appreciate, and the reader is left with no impulse to return to the work, for has he not just finished appreciating it again at second hand, with a guide almost certainly more charming, certainly less demanding than the original?

Secondly, the writer of the appreciative essay tends to confine himself to a rather limited literary area. Of Fielding, Mr. Kronenberger writes:

> *Tom Jones* belongs with those beneficent great novels that can be enjoyed quite as much as they are esteemed. The book is, indeed, so masculine, so solid, so engaging that, delighted as one is to talk it over with a friend, one shies off a little from assessing it as a critic. In a certain sense, one would as soon "assess" a good dinner. There are no dark things to be cleared up in *Tom Jones,* and no deep things to fathom; Fielding's masterpiece must be accounted among the great simple novels. One never stops reading the story to reflect on what it means; one never has half the impulse to look back that one has to move forward. For in the very best sense *Tom Jones* is an entertainment; it entertains you with all England at a lusty moment in her history.

The final statement underlines the point. Is Mozart "simple" because Schoenberg uses the twelve-tone method? Is not any true work of art entertainment "in the best sense"? Not only is this sort of essay directed toward writing where "sheer" appreciation is most possible, and not only is it apt to deceive itself about the degree and kind of simplicity to which its own temper reduces it, but also it prefers the "lusty moment," or life reproduced, to the created work, or literature.

And this leads us to the final limitation that is worth mentioning: the appreciative essay is most successful at the periphery of literature, least so at its heart. Easily assimilating the resources of scholarship and those few insights of criticism that he needs, Mr. Kronenberger writes most brilliantly in biographical sketches (as that of Gibbon, or, in passing, of Chesterton) or about figures whose biography is more interesting than their work (as in his very best essay, that on Lady Mary Wortley Montagu), and his entire preference is formed by this interest in the *circumstances* of literature. He should not, therefore, be held accountable for literature itself.

Everything that has here been observed is best summed up by Mr. Kronenberger himself in his essay on Virginia Woolf, almost all of which is applicable to him. He has written his own review.

> . . . Virginia Woolf nowhere altered the face of criticism . . . she extended no critical frontiers, she attracted no critical disciples. . . . Where we do find a purely critical perception, it is likely to seem neither new nor old, and we are likely to value it for its pertinence rather than its originality; or for the light it throws on Virginia Woolf. . . . These are things, we feel, that . . . say more succinctly what someone else has said first. . . . Having both an esthetic and historical sense, she was capable of really informed appreciation . . . her best work . . . has about it a real charm of artistry. One reads it a little less for profit than for pleasure, for its freshness, its shapeliness, its sensitiveness, for its language, its wit. . . . Too many of these pieces are book reviews, lectures, *jeux d'esprit,* made-to-order things that disappoint even as they divert us. . . . For acute as her historical sense clearly was, it preeminently reflected the student of manners; she was most at home, after all, in the Eighteenth Century. . . . She will survive, not as a critic, but as a literary essayist recording the adventures of a soul among congenial masterpieces.

The matter of Mr. Kronenberger's survival apart, this quotation implies his own ideal; it is not paltry. And yet it should be observed that at precisely the point where either Mrs. Woolf or Mr. Kronenberger had attempted to demonstrate the actualities of the literary values that their approach limits them to merely talking about, they would have crossed the line between the stu-

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dent of manners, the warm appreciator and the critic. And they might, of course, have been struck by the *frost* they fear.

We end with a paradox. Mr. Kronenberger's final sentences in "Pundits and Philistines" are these:

> That rusty jagged weapon "brilliant but unsound," wherewith academic dullards have always done in their betters, is now making itself a menace in criticism too. So many of our serious critics don't like brilliance; it suits their book no better than their temperaments. For brilliance is like lightning—either it flashes, or it flashes and hits something; whatever happens, there is not much to investigate.

At the risk of appearing to have wished to do in one's betters, one must still point out that Mr. Kronenberger has found enough to investigate, in his way, to have produced a considerable volume.

How Are the Chinese Communists Ruled?

by Robert C. North

WESTERN OBSERVERS tend to agree on the totalitarian nature of the Peking regime but to differ in their assessments of indigenous as against Russian influences, the resistance of traditional institutions and values to Communist onslaught, the pace and effectiveness of socialization, and the degree of support for or opposition to the system by the majority of the Chinese people.

Drawing extensively from Chinese Communist documentation, from the data of various Hong Kong listening posts, and from interviews with refugees, Richard Walker develops four major theses: that since its establishment in 1949 the Peking regime has been following the path of the Soviet Union under Stalin; that it has uprooted traditional Chinese institutions to the point where they are no longer an obstacle to the deep penetration of the invading Russian ideology; that Mao Tse-tung and his associates are rapidly pushing their country out of the New Democratic stage into a Soviet-style socialized economy; and that the people—though by now overwhelmingly opposed to the system—are economically, politically and psychologically so imprisoned that they cannot effectively resist it.

China Under Communism: The First Five Years, by Richard L. Walker, (Yale; $4.50).

There is fearful reality behind these theses, as the close documentation of Mr. Walker's timely investigation reveals.

From the day of its establishment the Chinese Communist government has functioned as a police state patterned after the Soviet model. The formal structure is very nearly a duplicate of the Russian framework, and all the devices and instruments for class warfare and the control of the people are present and in use—five year plan, forced labor, regimentation, violent land reform, the purging of intellectuals, secret police, the submergence of the individual in organizations controlled by the state, indoctrination through fear and psychological coercion.

Essentially, in Walker's view, the Chinese Communists have been trying to capsule over two decades of Soviet history into a few years. As a consequence, the whole of Chinese society has been transformed to a point where human values are subordinated to a mechanistic philosophy holding that economic environment and economically determined class relationships are solely responsible for man's behavior, thought pattern, and concepts of truth. "Never before," Walker concludes, "have the lives of so many people been so drastically changed in so short a time."

All activities of party and state are undertaken with this continuing transformation as the central purpose, and consequently it is against such purpose that Chinese Communist successes and failures must to some degree be measured. In building their economy, for example, Mao Tse-tung and his associates have often fallen short of their announced production goals. But the process of economic class warfare has ground relentlessly on until private sectors have been neutralized or wiped out, and in some respects, from a Communist viewpoint, it is this process that *matters.*

Similarly, to the Western agricultural specialist it would appear that the success of the Communist land program has been questionable. The central problem was too many people and too little land, and no amount of redistribution would really solve it. But among the real purposes of the Land Reform Movement were the complete destruction of the traditional pattern of rural life, including family ties, and the securing of economic and political control over the peasantry. Now that those goals have been achieved, the Communists move on toward rural collectivization and do not hesitate to build heavy industry at the expense of agriculture. In short, the land programs of the Peking government make sense largely as control measures and as preparation for totalitarian socialization of the economy.

This is not to minimize the technical shortcomings of the Chinese Communists in the fields of industry and agriculture. In attempting to industrialize their country, Walker points out, the Chinese have been forced to face up to some very grim realities. Given the size of the country, the relatively low level of industry, and the near-subsistence level of living, the problems involved in industrialization are tremendous. Beyond this, the Peking regime is faced by an explosive population problem which, in the doctrinaire fashion of Communists, they refuse to admit. For according to Marxist theory, there is no overpopulation, only underproduction and underconsumption. Whether the economy will grow at a rate to cope with the expanding needs of rapidly increasing numbers of people one cannot predict. The essential point is that once it has established economic, political and psychological controls, a modern police state can maintain itself in power for a long time regardless of internal conditions.

Walker believes that it is naked force rather than any appeal of its programs or policies which keeps the Chinese people subservient to the Peking regime. "The Communist leaders," he declares, "are acutely aware that much of their success in psychological control depends upon the ability to instill fear, and they also know that nothing instills fear more than public proof of the ability and will-

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ingness to employ force and violence." 1951 was a year of calculated and intense violence which spread fear over the country, laid the basis for subsequent consolidation of control, and did much to cripple any will which the Chinese people might have to resist. In the words of Mao Tse-tung:

> The three great movements which were developed in our country during the past year—resistance to American aggression and aid to Korea, land reform, and suppression of counter-revolutionaries—have achieved great victories. The remaining counter-revolutionaries on the mainland will shortly be in the main eliminated . . . our country has achieved a unification that is unprecedented.

Once its active opposition had been neutralized or physically exterminated, the regime could rely on other techniques to keep the population subservient. Every organization and institution in the state—even the schools and labor unions—became instruments of control, and by requiring endless mass participation in the many activities sponsored by the state, Communist leaders saw to it that no one had either the time or the energy for overt opposition. Beyond this, key individuals in every field were subjected to brain-washing techniques which made them virtual slaves to the system, and youngsters were rapidly caught up in the various youth drives and the more able among them assigned to cadre schools for transformation "into parts of the organized structure which will function automatically yet with enthusiasm and almost fanatic devotion to the cause of the party."

Such, in brief, is the picture which Mr. Walker presents of the Chinese Communist regime. It is quite possible to concur in his major substantive findings without sharing all of his interpretations and judgments. The Peking government's close affinity to the Soviet Union is undeniable, but one should not forget that many Chinese Communist impulses—including certain of their attitudes toward the West—were Asian before they were Communist. So, too, it is not inconceivable that the invading Russian ideology in its attack on traditional Chinese customs and institutions may itself undergo subtle transformations. This is not to suggest, thereby, that the Chinese Communists are less totalitarian or less dangerous; on the contrary, it is precisely their peculiar combinations of background and motivation that might, under certain circumstances, make them more difficult to deal with than the Russians.

One wonders, too, if there is yet any reliable basis for judging the degree of internal support or opposition to the regime. Unquestionably, large sectors of the populace have been alienated and are loyal only through coercion and fear. On the other hand totalitarian regimes of the Fascist and Communist varieties are notoriously adept at infusing both older cadres and younger masses with devotion and fanatic élan. It might be a serious error to conclude that Communist China is incapable of generating dynamism except through fear.

But even those who remain critical of these or like aspects of the study will agree, I think, that Mr. Walker has written an important book.

A Zoologist Looks at People

by Bruce Bliven

MARSTON BATES is a zoologist, not a demographer, which gives his book on the population problem a freshness it might not otherwise possess. It also causes him to wander down some scientific bypaths that would be unlikely in the works of such men as Robert Cook, William Vogt, Fairfield Osborn or Harrison Brown. In the sprightly, readable style familiar to those who enjoyed his popular book on life in the tropics, *Where Winter Never Comes,* he accumulates a lot of evidence about human fertility in the past and present, with a rather timid glance at what it may be in the future.

The Prevalence of People, by Marston Bates (Scribner's; $3.95).

Recognizing the huge increase in population that has resulted where death rates have gone down sixty or seventy percent while birth rates have declined hardly at all, he refuses to be panicked by this situation. Pointing out that nowhere in the world is the birth rate as high as it would be if left to purely biological factors, he feels that the tendency of human culture everywhere is toward fewer babies. In many places this tendency is far more than offset by the increase in numbers made possible by modern public-health services, but he stubbornly puts his faith in the ultimate reluctance of the human race to commit mass suicide. The same argument is the only one he can offer against the danger of world destruction through a war employing hydrogen bombs or something newer and worse.

> If anything is clear from history and anthropology [he says] it is the great plasticity of culture. It has changed, sometimes with surprising rapidity; and in terms of our values of individual freedom, of the right to health and happiness for the greatest possible number, the over-all changes, particularly in the West, have surely been toward improvement. . . . Man and this culture of his are curious phenomena—with the equipment we have, essentially unpredictable. In this uncertainty I find my hope.

This is not a book for the expert in demography, or even for the intelligent layman with a special interest in that generally gloomy subject. It is a book for the average reader who enjoys good writing, and is fascinated — as who isn't?—by a miscellaneous array of information on human biology and ecology, centered around the general theme of man and his main problems today. Such a reader could hardly do better than to sample Mr. Bates' pleasant and unpretentious work.

Notes on Contributors

IRVING HOWE teaches at Brandeis University and is the editor of *Dissent.* MARK SCHORER's novel, *The Wars of Love,* was published last year; he is professor of English at the University of California. ROBERT C. NORTH is the author of *Moscow and the Chinese Communists.* BRUCE BLIVEN, one-time editor of the *New Republic,* now lives in California.

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Why Johnny Can't Read

SIRS:

Miss Lois Rettie's indignant review of Dr. Rudolph Flesch's *Why Johnny Can't Read* (*NR*, June 13) seems to call for some reply. I will admit that the book is doubtless quite unscientific . . . but then, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was not exactly a documented sociological treatise. When a public problem exists, it has to be presented in a way the public can not only understand, but take notice of. And the fact is that, with all too few honorable exceptions, American education has gone to hell in the proverbial handbasket. . . . We are raising a generation of the barely literate.

This is not to advocate a return to the 19th Century and the little red schoolhouse, complete with birch rods. But in reacting to the faults of the old system, we have ignored its virtues, of which the chief was mental discipline.

In short, we need to recognize the fact that learning is work, and that a good deal of this work is inherently dreary. The progressives have much to offer in the way of special counselling and devices for relieving the tedium; but the old-fashioned scholar has his place too, and it ought to be central.

POUL ANDERSON

Berkeley, California

• • •

SIRS:

Lois M. Rettie's review is the best I have seen! She evidently knows schools and took the trouble to read Flesch's book carefully.

The really serious harm which that book is doing is to provoke ill-considered attacks upon schools and teachers. Malcolm Cowley's letter in your issue of June 20 is a painful example. Mr. Cowley is a first-rate literary critic, much more intelligent than most of the people who are being subjected to *Why Johnny Can't Read* and to the even worse newspaper articles growing out of it. Yet Mr. Cowley flies into a tirade against the "educationists," falling into errors of fact and expressing unsound, hearsay opinion. He says that a year's study in a teacher's college is required for high-school teaching, whereas this is not true in any of our states. A great many—some say more than half—of our high-school teachers get their training in arts colleges. His *opinion* that educationists are racketeers, and that they invent new methods in order to create a demand for new books which they will write is mistaken, in the English language arts at least. During 50 years of teaching ranging from junior high school into senior college I have been in close touch with practically all the theory and much of the teaching. I *know* that there has been only a gradual evolution, so gradual that today's leading high-school texts in composition could have been used very comfortably by successful teachers 40 years ago. And some texts of the second decade of this century would work very satisfactorily in the classes of most teachers now. In elementary-school reading there has been a bit more of change, but no sharp reform since the old phonics-first method was dropped.

Many English professors' antagonism toward educationists, which Mr. Cowley has absorbed, arises from a struggle for time in the college curriculum. The educationists say that many English courses are pedantic, too remote from daily life. *Some* of them, as *sometimes* given, are. The English professors say that the courses in education are shallow and repetitious. Some of *them*, as *sometimes* given, are. I know rather well many leaders in both groups, and find them both intelligent and conscientious. Wholesale condemnation of either group, and especially attribution of petty and selfish motives, is grossly unfair.

W. WILBUR HATFIELD

Chicago, Illinois

• • •

SIRS:

Miss Rettie invites us to read, "as rapidly and intelligently as you can," a passage from the will of Sir Thomas Gresham quoted by Dr. Flesch. She prints the passage and follows it with a couple of smug rhetorical questions. "Tough going, isn't it? Why did you do so much stumbling . . . ?" Well, speaking as a guinea-pig, I hate to disappoint a scientist, but it wasn't and I didn't. Neither did three other people whom I chose at random to read the same passage. I can only say how sorry I am for Miss Rettie that she should be cut off from so much interesting and valuable writing in her own language. But she is, apparently, not asking for sympathy. She is making a point. "What the quotation does prove is that any reader who is compelled to depend upon phonetics to unravel the meaning of one word after another is terribly handicapped." This leaves me baffled. Does she mean that you must depend on "look-say," and thus not read Elizabethan English at all unless it is translated into words you know? Or does she mean that "look-say" is better than spelling for Elizabethan English, because "perfformans" *looks* like "performance" and is hence recognizable as the same word? If that is so, then what about all the words in modern English that *look* like each other and aren't?

Finally, what are we to make of the statement that "*reading* in the true sense . . . does involve an understanding of what the words mean."? At one level it is a truism. At another it is an apparently wanton piece of *petitio principi*. Milton's daughters read Greek to him without understanding a word of what they read. Certainly they didn't "know" Greek. Equally certainly they did know the Greek alphabet and could "decode" symbols from visual into auditory form. That after all is what "reading" basically is; a very simple form of decoding which was quite widespread even among uneducated people, until Miss Rettie and her like came along. We all concede that ultimately what is read must be understood. But on the whole, it is easier to learn the alphabet first, which will enable you to read any word in the language. You can then go to a teacher, or to the context of the word, or even to a dictionary, to aid your understanding. The alternative approach, of learning the visual form *and meaning* (I take it this is what Miss Rettie wants) of every word as it comes along, is obviously impracticable. Luckily, not even the most rabid "look-say" enthusiasts apply it. And, incidentally, has Miss Rettie ever watched the struggles of a "look-say" (*i.e.* analphabetic) child trying to

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find an unfamiliar word in a dictionary, or even to run down an entry in an index?

M. R. D. VOX

Toronto, Canada

• • •

Lois M. Rettie's superb discussion of the Flesch book is . . . in keeping with the liberal position of your journal. . . . It is vastly to your credit, I feel, that you have found so adequate a reviewer.

JEANETTE VEATCH

Levittown, N. Y.

► Correct or Colloquial?

SIRS:

When reading the *New Republic* I keep a look out for any ways in which the meanings of words or the grammatical constructions differ from our English so that if ever I have the good fortune to visit the USA, I may not misunderstand or be misunderstood.

But in T. R. B.'s column of your issue for May 2 occurs the sentence: "It did not used to be this way." Is this correct American? Some years ago I heard a small boy correcting his friend thus: "you didn't ought to say 'I didn't used' " and he was rather aggrieved when I reminded him "you ought not to say 'you didn't ought'."

P. DENNIS GOODALL

Basingstoke, Hants, England

► American in Paris

SIRS:

As an American who has had the privilege of spending this year in France, I deplore Saul Bellow's extrapolating some unpleasant personal experiences into a generalized slur on his hosts. ("The French as Dostoevsky Saw Them," *NR*, May 23).

Evidently Mr. Bellow was unable to gain a sympathetic insight into the psychological trauma of a war tortured people. Still more, he is gnawed at by his failure to penetrate into the "closed" French society. We, on the contrary—parents and children—have found all the doors open, and enjoyed warmest hospitality and friendships.

The patent injustice of Mr. Bellow's remarks reveals how unsuccessful he has been in his avowed efforts to overcome an irrational aversion. "To a Frenchman this French world is *the* world." Can he be that blind to the provincialism and national smugness of Americans? A storekeeper comments, *"la chaleur est plus brutale chez vous."* Well it is, isn't it?

No, I am not an unadulterated Francophile. We've had plenty of gripes and unpleasant experiences, some as bad as Mr. Bellow's. But let's look at ourselves, when we judge others. Is the bureaucratic, red-tape mind he describes different elsewhere—let us say, among our immigration officials? Is there less xenophobia in the US, or more?

LESTER G. CROCKER

Paris, France

► Shakespeare on Wiretapping

SIRS:

The quote about "If it were done . . ." with which I concluded my article on wiretapping ("The Wiretap Scandal," *NR*, June 20) is from *Macbeth*, while in the article it is attributed to *Hamlet*, a matter which will probably have the *NR*'s literary public guffawing about those lawyers and political scientists who try to use literary allusions.

ALAN F. WESTIN

Cambridge, Mass.

BANDWAGON

"OF THE SEVEN most prominent Bevanites, four were re-elected easily, three were barely returned, two were defeated."—*New Republic*, June 6, 1955.

"FREEDOM of the press, as well as freedom of speech," asserted Mr. Eldridge, "is a limited—not an absolute—right. It is a limited right, legally," he said. "It is still more limited, practically.

"Newspapers, magazines and networks are dependent for their very existence on the support of readers, listeners and advertisers. . . . This fact is given implicit recognition in the constant effort to find out what readers and listeners want—and to give it to them.

"Yet there are some publications and some executives of the broadcast industry who seem to concede no similar right or interest to advertisers.

"They permit the use in their columns or over their stations of material clearly inimical to business and businessmen. . . ." —*Advertising Age*, June 13, 1955.

WITH NOT a vote to spare, the [California] Senate yesterday approved Assembly legislation declaring it to be against state policy for schools to refuse to hire qualified teachers because of race, color or creed.

Sen. Louis G. Sutton [R, Maxwell] assailed the measure as a "trouble-maker bill," asserting:

"Small groups of minority people will send well-qualified people to apply just to make trouble."—*San Francisco Chronicle*, June 8, 1955.

YEARS AGO, it was demonstrated that the states which boast the largest per-capita expenditures on education are the states in which the percentage of Communists is greatest; and, conversely, the states with the lowest per-capita expenditures on education have the smallest percent of Communists. — *American Mercury*, July, 1955.

SPECIAL—New books half price or less—From Copernicus to Einstein—$1.00; The Road to Abundance by Rosin and Eastman — $1.50; Apostles of Discord—$1.50; Ideologies and American Labor—$1.00; Killers of the Dream—$1.50; Generation of Vipers—$1.50; In Place of Fear by Aneurin Bevan—$1.50, all postpaid. Or send for sale catalog. University Book Service, 208 East Patterson, Columbus 2, Ohio.

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POPULAR SONGS VS. THE FACTS OF LIFE—Lead article by S. I. Hayakawa in current issue of *ETC.*, official journal of Int'l Society for General Semantics, edited by S. I. Hayakawa. Read how language forms tend to limit thought, behavior. $4 year; trial issue $1. Write Dept. 22, 400 W. North Ave., Chicago 10, Ill.

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"The Fourth of July in the Country"
— drawn by Thomas Worth, 1868.

Some A B C's

ONE ILLUSION, to which Reinhold Niebuhr does not refer in his article in this issue, is that liberals see life as a grim and calamitous affair (see "A"). Another is that liberals (see "B") waste their time scolding and haranguing an audience that isn't listening.

But the reality of the matter, as Dr. Niebuhr would doubtless agree, is that *this* liberal Journal is glad of a chance to cheer (see "C") whenever it spots a victory, large or small, in the everlasting fight for liberty.

And the latest victory we happily report is the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals on the "natural" right of every American citizen to travel abroad.

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